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EXCLUSIVE: SC and the Hamiltonian dilemma —Shubhankar Dam 
 
In a blatant violation of the short order declaring Sharif’s “inalienable right to 
return,” the Musharraf administration forced him to return to London. The facts 
are well-known: the media, in Pakistan and beyond, widely covered the political 
drama 
 
By a short order on August 22, a constitution bench of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan declared the inalienable right of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and 
his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif to enter and remain in Pakistan. In a recently delivered 
judgment, the Court has recorded its detailed reasons for its earlier order.  
 
The judgment liberally uses the language of constitutional rights and rule of law while limiting 
the exercise of executive authority without legal basis. The text of the judgment revolves 
around three main themes: maintainability of the petition under Article 184(3), the meaning of 
“public importance” and the scope of the right to “remain in ... enter and move freely 
throughout Pakistan” under Article 15.  
Raja Ibrahim Satti, counsel for the Federation of Pakistan, argued that the SC was not an 
appropriate forum since effective remedy could be provided by the High Court under Article 
199. Javed Iqbal J., writing for the Court, rejected the argument. Articles 184(3) and 199, he 
said, provide for distinct remedies. None of the procedural limitations applicable to a petition 
under Article 199 were relevant for the purposes of Article 184(3).  
The text suggests that the SC, under Article 184(3), was claiming unlimited powers: it could 
adjudicate on disputed questions of facts, condone delays and latches and even do away with 
rules concerning locus standi.  
Iqbal J. fell back on the dictum from Benazir Bhutto to provide a normative foundation for this 
“unlimited role:” “The inquiry into law and life,” he repeated “cannot ... be confined to the 
narrow limits of the rule of law in the context of constitutionalism which makes greater 
demand on judicial functions.” Interestingly, the language about judicial participation in “life 
and law” is strikingly reminiscent of the approach the Indian Supreme Court adopted in the 
early 80s.  
AG Malik Qayyum contested the maintainability of the petition on the ground of “public 
importance”: the grievances canvassed did not affect the public at large and the petition, 
therefore, could not be accepted under Article 184(3). Relying on the dictum in Zaheer Abbasi, 
Iqbal J. refused to equate “public importance” with “public at large”. Article 184(3), he said, 
provides “abundant scope for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of an individual or a 
group or class of persons in the event of their infraction”.  
In other words, even the violation of the fundamental rights of a particular individual, under 
some circumstances, may be considered a matter of public importance. The Sharif brothers 
were popular politicians and had held important public offices. Keeping in mind the pending 
general elections, the Court arrived at the “inescapable conclusion that the petitions were 
maintainable”. 
 
But this merely raised another question: why had the SC dismissed Shahbaz Sharif’s petition 
in 2004? The Court’s rationalisation on the point is hard to follow. “It is to be kept in view that 
the earlier petition on behalf of Shahbaz Sharif,” Iqbal J. said “was dismissed being non-
maintainable as it was filed in his individual capacity ... and the element of public 
importance ... was missing”. So why accept the petition now? For the Court, the position has 
apparently changed altogether: the petitions had been jointly filed by the Sharifs and PMLN 
and had thus acquired a “public” character.  
The differences between the reasons for accepting the present petitions and rejecting the 
petition in 2003 are hard to reconcile. It may well be that the differences in the treatment of 
the two petitions lie not in law but elsewhere.  
Finally, the Court needed to address the scope of the freedom of movement under Article 15. 
Broadly, Article 15 guarantees three rights to citizens — (a) the right to remain in Pakistan (b) 
the right to enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and (c) the right to reside and settle in 
any part of Pakistan. The language of the provision, the Court concluded, was “free from any 
ambiguity and no scholarly interpretation” was needed. But that can hardly be the case: the 
very assertion that a provision is “free from ambiguity” is in itself an interpretation, scholarly 
or otherwise.  
Relying on Shahbaz Sharif, the Court drew the following conclusion: “The right to enter in the 
country cannot be denied but a citizen can be restrained from going out of the country.” The 
text of Article 15 makes the “right to enter and move freely throughout Pakistan” specifically 
subject to reasonable restriction imposed by law in public interest. And, therefore, it is difficult 
to understand why the right to enter cannot be denied.  
But the soundness of the reasoning notwithstanding, the real test of the judgment is yet to 
come. “The upshot of the above discussion,” the Court emphatically said “is that no restriction 
can be imposed on the right of the petitioners to enter into Pakistan ...”. 
Ironically, in a blatant violation of the short order declaring Sharif’s “inalienable right to 
return,” the Musharraf administration forced him to return to London. The facts are well-
known: the media, in Pakistan and beyond, widely covered the political drama.  
 
But the violation is, at once, a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, it challenges the 
Court’s faith in the very text it authored. Did the judges really believe in what they wrote? Can 
they really act on their words? On the other hand, it is an opportunity: it gives the Court an 
occasion to morally indict the administration and reclaim its lost constitutional space.  
Alexander Hamilton, writing in 1788, explained the judiciary’s limitations thus: “The judiciary, 
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.” “The Executive,” 
he added, “holds the sword of the community [and] the legislature ... prescribes the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.” 
“The judiciary, on the contrary,” he ruled “has no influence over either the sword or the purse; 
[it has] neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” And, therefore, Hamilton concluded: 
“The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; it can 
never attack with success either of the other two ...”. 
In less than a week, the SC will reassemble to hear the contempt case against the 
administration for violating the order recognising Sharif’s the right to return. Can it prove 
Hamilton wrong?  
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